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THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION'S 
FAIRNESS REGULATIONS: A FIRST STEP 
TOWARDS CREATION OF A RIGHT 
OF ACCESS TO THE MASS MEDIA 
Broadcasters whose facilities are used to express one point of view 
have traditionally been required to provide reply time to the opposing 
point of view.1 Recently, the Federal Communications Commission 
codified two aspects of this traditional "fairness doctrine" -the require-
ments of reply time to both personal attacks and editorial endorse-
ments.2 A current challenge to these new regulations raises a compelling 
1 The Federal Communications Commission's predecessor, the Federal Radio Com-
mission, tried to discourage what it called "propaganda stations." See Great Lakes 
Broadcasting Co., No. 4900, FEDERAL RADIO COMM'N, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 32, 34-35 
(1929). 
The FCC's "fairness doctrine" was first crystallized in Editorializing by Broadcast 
Licensees, No. 8516, 14 Fed. Reg. 3055 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Editorializing Report]. 
The fairness doctrine is different from the equal time provisions of the Communications 
Act of 1934, § 315, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964), which apply only to appearances by "legally 
qualified" candidates. 
2 47 C.F.R:. § 73.123 (1968), as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 5364 (1968): 
Personal attacks; political editorials. 
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public 
importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like 
personal qUalities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a 
reasonable time and in no event later than one week after the attack, transmit to 
the person or group attacked (I) notification of the date, time and identification 
of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape 
is not available) of the attack; and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to 
respond over the licensee's facilities. 
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not be applicable 
(I) to attacks on foreign groups or foreign public fignres; (2) to personal attacks 
which are made by legally qualified candidates, their authorized spokesmen, or 
those associated with them in the campaign, on other such candidates, their 
authorized spokesmen, or persons associated with the candidate in the campaign; 
and (3) to bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews and on-the· spot 
coverage of a bona fide news event (including commentary or analysis contained 
in the foregoing programs, but the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section 
shall be applicable to editorials of the licensee). 
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii) opposes a legally 
qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee shall, within 24 hours after the 
editorial, transmit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or candidates 
for the same office or (ii) the candidate opposed in the editorial (I) notification 
of the date and the time of the editorial; (2) a script or tape of the editorial; 
and (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of 
the candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities: Provided, however, That 
where such editorials are broadcast within 72 hours prior to the day of the 
election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions of this paragraph sufficiently 
far in advance of the broadcast to enable the candidate or candidates to have 
a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response and to present it in a timely 
fashion. 
The personal attack doctrine was first promulgated in a series of proceedings in 1962. 
294 
FAIRNESS REGULATIONS 295 
first amendment question. Are the regulations the unreasonable inhibi-
tion on free speech which the Seventh Circuit found them to be in 
Radio Television News Directors Association v. United States;3 or are 
they instead the first step towards the creation of a right of access to the 
mass media? The courts should reevaluate the fairness doctrine and 
emphasize its underlying purpose as a step towards recoguition of true 
first amendment freedom. 
I 
ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
Since both the new regulations and the fairness doctrine require 
reply time only after a broadcaster has made or countenanced an ini-
tial statement,4 the major differences betw'een the traditional doctrine 
and the regulations are in procedure, sanctions, and perhaps psychology. 
Under the doctrine, the mechanics of offering reply time were dis-
cretionary with the broadcaster; the regulations, however, set definite 
standards. More significantly, the Commission formerly could enforce 
the doctrine only by the cumbersome and extreme sanctions of revoking 
or refusing to renew a license; neither was ever done.1) Under the nc:w 
Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P &: F RADIO REG. 404 (1962); Billings Broadcasting Co., 
23 P &: F RADIO REG. 951 (1962); Clayton W. Mapoles, 23 P &: F RADIO REG. 586 (1962). It 
was developed more fully in Stations' Responsibilities Under Fairness Doctrine as to 
Controversial Issue Programming, 28 Fed. Reg. 7962 (1963). The editorial endorsement 
section stems directly from the Editorializing Report. 
3 Radio Telev. News Dir. Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), 
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.s.L.W. 3185 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1968) (No. 717) [hereinafter cited as 
RTNDA v. United States]. The petitioners in the two companion actions were the Na-
tional Broadcasting Co. and the Columbia Broadcasting System. Petitioners attempted, by 
the extraordinary means of certiorari before the judgment of the Seventh Cilcuit, to have 
theil actions set down for argument with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 
908 (D.C. Cil. 1967), cert. j5ranted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 600, 1967 Term; renumbered 
No.2, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L. W. 3001 (1968», which challenged the prior personal attack 
doctrine on first amendment grounds. Theil petition was denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968), 
but the Red Lion case was stayed until decision by the Seventh Cilcuit. 390 U.s. 916 
(1968). 
4 Although the Commission has sometimes intimated that a licensee has a duty to 
initiate debate, Editorializing Report at 3057, a licensee can avoid controversy without 
sanction. Affirmative action is required only after the broadcaster has initially taken a 
position. WSOC Broadcasting Co., 17 P &: F RADIO REG. 548 (1958); Jefferson Std. Broad-
casting Co., 17 P &: F RADIO REG. 339 (1958); Alabama Broadcasting System, Inc., 17 P &: F 
RADIO REG. 273 (1958). A failure to handle any controversial subjects might, of course, 
be taken into consideration on application for renewal. See note 56 infra. 
I) Two Commissioners recently commented that "the only way in which members of the 
public can prevent renewal of an unworthy station's license is to steal the document from 
the wall of the station's studio in" the dead of night •••• " Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 
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regqlatiom, however, mor~ fJ,~xible statutory ~an,ction& ar~ applicable6 
~p~rhap~ indicll:ting a real intent to enforce the regqlatiQns. 
Alth<:mgh the r~gulations promote pl,lblic information and fair-
nes:) in controversial is:;ueli, they pose an economic threC!,t to the indus-
try. Slightly more than a month before proJ)mlglltion of the regulati.onfl, 
the Commi:)sion held thc!'t the doc;trine required reply time to dgarette 
commercials.7 The spectre of Commission codification of the cigarette 
ruling, its extension to other types of advertising, and its vigorous en-
forcement must have greatly disturbed both broadcasters and advertis-
ing men. 
Broadcasters, both individually and in concert, have traditionally 
avoided controversial programming because sponsors are hesitant to 
become even subliminally associated with opinions disagreeable to 
potential purchasers.s In 1939, for example, a convention of broad-
casters resolved to restrict themselves in the broadcast of controversial 
material.9 And when the Commission, two years later, handed down a 
blanket prohibition on radio editorializing,1° broadcasters were silent; 
during the eight years that the ruling was in effect, it was never chal-
lenged.ll 
-- , 
13 l' ~ f RAnIa REG. ~d 769, 817 (196~) (CQ1ll1ll'rs Co~ and JohJ}Son, dis~eIlting). Shol;"tly 
after the Lamar Life decision, and J;>erhaps as a sop to the critics of that decision, the 
Co~mission began a rwe-m,Il<ing prQcedure relating to racial discrimination by licensees. 
Nondiscrimination in Emp1oym<!nt Prac~ices qf Bl;oadcast Licellsees, 33 Fed. Reg. 9960 
(196~). A case which may represen~ a. break with this traditiQn of inactiQn, 4owever, is 
WXUR, which was designated for p.earing ill Brandywine.Mainfule Radio, Inc., 9 l' ~ F 
RADIO REG. 2d 126 (1967). In that qase, unlike the /..a,mar [..ife case, the ~roadcast Bureau 
has recQmmended that ~e Commi~sioll retuse to renew the station's license. See also 
Barron, The Federal Communi,;ations COmmission'~ Faimess Doc;trine: I1n J!;va,(llatitm, 30 
OEO. WASlI. L, !tw. 1, 19-20 (1!l61), The Commission'!; ability to resist political J;>ressure 
tp.ay be questionilble. See Note, ReguliZti(m of l!rogram Cont(lnt By the Fe4eral CQm-
mUllit;atian~ CQmmissiall, 77 ~V. J." REv, 701, 716 (1964). 
Perhap~ the clearest indiC!l.tion thilt the Commj$sion has been less than effective in 
enforcing the fairnes$ doctrine is that prolJ,dcasters themse1ve~ have neveJ; been par-
ticularly disturbed over the doctrine. Rllarings on H.R. 7072, 7550, 791,2 ],lefore the 
ROllSe Comm. On Interstate a,nd For~ign Gommerct:, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 19Q-96, ~6$.(i4 
(1963) (T~stimony of D, Rops, Nat'J Mls'n of Broadcasters, and, F. Stanton, CBS). 
6 The sanctions include cease and desist orders, criminal fines, and civil forfeitures. 
47 U.s.C. §§ 31~(b), 50g, 1i03 (1964). 
7 WCl3S-TV, 9 P &: f R,ADIO REG, gd l4~3, 1425 (1967), Th~s &nort ruling was I;"eaflirmed 
jn WCBS.TV, 11 P &: 11 RAn~o REy, 24 l!lOl (1967). 
II N. Mmow, EQl,Jj\l. TJM~: THE PRIVAl"E BROADGi\STER Am> THE PUBLIC IN~ 7~,76 
(L. Laure~t ed. 1964). Ironic;tl1y, Mr, Minow \s counsel for CBS in the R'INDA cas~. 
\I L. WHITE, 'l'JJE A~ERICAN RAnIa 74-76, 245-51 (1948), 
10 Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 1I.C.C, 31)3 (1941). 
11 Bqt was ~t constitutional? The l?rOlldcastel;"$ we):e ~ot di~osed to find out. 
After aU, WMB hll-d. ~een renewed, and that was t4e m~ ~ng. Why ti~ 
losing yOJ.Jr licen$e ju~t to get a c~e to the Ilup):em~ Cou):ti' 
L. WHITE~ supra note 9, at 177. ., 
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Thus broadcasters adti:illy look' to the first amendment as a guar-
antee of economic rather than civil rights. When a potenti:il financial 
interest is at stake, however, they are quick to raise the free speech 
standardJ portraying themselves as earnest educators of the public ahd 
the Coinmission as a bureaucratic and malicious censor, 
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in News Directors Association 
accepted this caricature. With a narrow outlook that must have enraged 
some members of the Commission, the court sniped: "Apparently the 
Commission views programming which takes sides on a given issue to be 
somehow improper .... "12 It seemed, in fact, sympathetic to the broad-
casters' protest that "an opportunity to reply might result iIi the public 
airing of obnoxious or extreme vie'Ws."13 
11 
Do THE REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE FmsT AMENDMENT? 
There are nV'o approaches to the fallacious argument that broad-
casting enjoys only limited first amendment protection.14 The first-
and the only one considered by the Seventh Circuit-is based upon 
some unclear comments by the Supreme Court that regulation is proper 
because the number of frequencies is limited.15 As the Seventh Circuit 
12 400 F.2d at 1014. 
131d. 
14 There is also a simplistic and specious argument that the first amendment does 
not apply to radio because the Supreme Court has never directly so held. In National 
:Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943), however, the Court held 
that the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations did not violate the first amend-
ment-which would seem to imply that the amendment applied to radio. The District 
of Columbia Circuit seemed to read the National Broadcasting case this way in Red Lion 
:Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 923 (1967). cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 
600, 1967 Term; renumbered No.2, 1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (1968». See also United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (dictum). 
The Communications Act of 1934, § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964), requires the Com-
mission not to "interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communica-
tion:' This statute is probably contiguous with the first amendment and, accordingly, any 
decision that the regulations violate the first amendment could be based on the statute, 
thereby avoiding the whole constitutional issue. 
15 In National :Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943), the Court 
said, "Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is 
its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject 
to goverumental regulation." The language of the Court might indicate that it was endors-
ing only the naked requirement of a license. It ended its discussion by saying, "The right 
of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without 
a license." ld. at 227. Nevertheless, the case did uphold much more than mere licensing. 
The Court approved a very complex set of regulations which, inter alia. limited the net-
works' ability to take away local station autonomy, id. at 200, 202, 204, 206, and which 
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correctly pointed out, this "scarcity doctrine" is open to a dual chal-
lenge.16 First, as a matter of law, the dicta that gave birth to it did not 
delineate the degree of allowable regulation. Second, the number of 
usable frequencies has mushroomed in recent years, making possible 
at least an FM or UHF allocation for anyone able to buy the basic 
equipment.l7 
A second possible basis for denying or limiting first amendment 
protection for broadcasting is that free speech guarantees do not attach 
when the primary purpose of communication is profit.18 Arguably, the 
advertisers' infiltration of broadcasting places the whole industry in 
this category. But the "commercial purpose" doctrine has other limita-
tions. First, the news and discussion programs on which personal attacks 
and editorial endorsements are most likely to take place are often run 
at a loss. Second, it is doubtful that the present Supreme Court would 
find motive so determinative of first amendment rights. The Court's 
recent emphasis on public issues shows that it is interested in whether 
speech adds to the public debate and not in its originator's state of 
mind.19 
accordingly affected the actual output of local stations. Thus National Broadcasting must 
be read as authorizing at least limited program control by the Commission. 
It must be remembered that the Court has approved affirmative antitrust action 
which probably had some effect upon speech. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 
U.s. 1 (1945). Almost directly in point with the fairness regulations is Lorain Journal Co. 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). There the Court upheld an antitrust decree which 
ordered the defendant newspaper to accept advertisements from merchants who also 
advertised on a local radio station. The Court relied upon the Associated Press case. Id. 
at 155-56. Thus the Seventh Circuit's statement that the regulations impose burdens 
''which would be in flat violation of the first amendment if applied to newspaper pub-
lishers," 400 F.2d at 1018, is highly questionable. It should also be noted that some com-
mentators propose applying fairness-like requirements to the press. Barron, Access to the 
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967); Note, A Fairness 
Doctrine For The Press, 40 N.D.L. REv. 317 (1964). 
16 400 F.2d at 1019. 
17 Id. 
Limitations on VHF-TV allocations may also be seen as solely economic, since com-
munity antenna television's phenomenal growth makes it possible for any entrepreneur 
to set himself up in the television busines:r-albeit by means of a cable rather than the 
airwaves. 
This raises the thorny question of whether the scarcity doctrine applies to broad-
casting as a whole, or only to the parts of it in which there is an existing scarcity of 
frequencies. If the latter is the case, the anomalous result of holding that the FM but 
not the AM part of a simultaneous AM-FM operation is protected by the first amend· 
ment may be logically demanded. 
18 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)_ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964), indicates that the doctrine is still viable tOday. 
19 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Brennan, The Supreme Court and 
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965). 
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In considering the merits of the broadcasters' first amendment 
argument, the Seventh Circuit used an "unreasonable burden" test20 
which it derived from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan21 and later cases. 
Although refusing to pass on the constitutionality of the traditional 
fairness doctrine,22 the court found that the regulations constituted a 
greater and more constitutionally impermissible inhibition on free 
speech than did the doctrine.23 It decided first that the regulations' re-
quirement of specific procedures for notification and granting of reply 
time limited licensee discretion more than did the traditional doc-
trine.24 This position is questionable because the actual differences 
between the doctrine and the regulations are only in procedure and 
sanction. There is no significant change in the programs covered, and 
the decision whether, for example, a given broadcast represents an 
editorial endorsement remains within the initial judgment of the 
licensee. His discretion is limited only in his actions after a positive 
judgment. Prior to the regulations, questionable conduct would not 
cause concern because the only available sanction was too severe for 
the conduct. With the regulations, however, the broadcaster need only 
wrestle in good faith with the question.25 
More significantly, the Seventh Circuit objected on two grounds 
to the statutory sanctions by which the Commission could enforce the 
regulations:26 (1) that the new, wider range of sanctions made punish-
ment more severe; and (2) that the sanctions could be imposed after a 
20 400 F.2d at 1012. 
21 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The regulations bear some resemblance to the statute involved 
in New York Times. The Alabama libel statute there involved conditioned the plaintiff's 
right to recover 'Punitive damages upon the defendant's refusal to retract; under the 
regulations, a broadcaster's failure or refusal to offer to provide reply time exposes him 
to the sanctions of the Commission. This similarity, however, is somewhat misleading. 
New York Times involved a staggering punitive damages award, and the most amateur 
judicial-entrail reader can fairly speculate that if the Times had retracted and if plaintiff 
Sullivan had recovered only nominal compensatory damages the Court would not have 
viewed the Alabama judgment as such a massive inhibition on free speech. 
22 400 F.2d at 1017-18. 
23 [d. at 1012-13. 
24 [d. 
25 Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules, No. 16574, 8 F.C.C.2d 721 (1967). The Seventh 
Circuit seemed to think that the good faith immunity made the rules "broader than 
necessary," since it made them applicable to all licensees while punishing only those who 
acted in bad faith. 400 F.2d at 1021. First, this seems to be a fairly general principle of 
regulatory law. Second, the traditional fairness doctrine carries such an immunity, without 
rnnning afoul of any constitutional bar. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the 
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415, 10416 (1964). 
26 400 F.2d at 1013. 
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single objectionable broadcast. But when the only sanction, failure to 
renew a license, amcmIited to economiC elimination, the offenses iti~ 
volved must necessatily have been most grave. With the inttoductioIi 
of limited sanctions, e.g., fines of up to bfle thousand ddIlars pet day 
of vioiation,27 lesser misconduct tail be punished. It is difficUlt to 
imagine fines fbr violation of the regtilations giving rise to the "virtu-
ally unlimited" liability which the Supreme Court envisaged in New 
York Times.28 Moreovet, the Commissitm has always had the power to 
revoke a license durirtg the term of a license fot failure to tomply with 
the fairness doctrine.29 As a practical matter, of course, the promul-
gation of the regulations demonstrates the Commissioh'S desire fat 
sanctions which it Cail effectively enforce. But it is anomalous to test 
the constitutionality of a regulation on the psycho1ogy underlying its 
administrative creation. 
Finally, the Court held that the regulations were too vague for 
licensees to foliow effectively.ao Although this deCision involves an ele-
ment of judicial faCt finding, it is also questionable. First, the regula-
tions cail be construed in the light of the many decisions under the 
traditional fairness doctrine.31 Second, that they were promulgated for 
27 COminunicatiohs Act of 1934, §§ 502, 503, 47 u.s.d. §§ 502, 503 (HiM). 
28 376 U.S. at 279. 
29 The Communications Act of 1934, § 312(a)(2), 47 u.s.a. § 312(a)(2) (1964), empowers 
the Commission to revoke a license on any grounds for which it would deny a license. 
It seems reasonable, therefore, that any conduct which would justify a refusal to renew 
a license would also justify license revocation. 
It may, of course, be argued that revocation of a license for such a limited course 
6f conduct "ll/ould be so harsh as to violate the dUe process clause of the fifth amendment. 
The Supreme Court has, however. never approached the question. And in the somewhat 
related area of the severity of fines it has more or less giVeh the states a free hand. See 
Waters-Pierce Oil Co, v. Texas, 212 U.S, 86 (1909). 
30 400 F.2d at 1014-17. The court did not, however, go so far as to hold the rules void 
for vagueness. Rather, it rested its argument on the self-censoring potential of vague laws 
in first amendment areas. 
It would be difficult to make out a case that the regulations are void for vagueness; 
they are at least reasonably comprehensible and a violation does not lead to criminal 
sanctions. See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1951). The court noted 
that while any vague laws are unconstitutional, those involving first amendment rights 
receive special scrutiny. 400 F.2d at 1011, citing Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 
(1966). Arguably the vagueness doctrine applies to administrative regulations imposing 
non-criminal liability because it appiies to statutes imposing such liability. Boutilier v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 381 U.s. US, 123 (1967). Otherwse it does not apply 
at all. 
31 Cases cited note 2 supra. While the administrative agency cases are hardly binding 
on the Seventh Circuit, they must contain some iessons for both broadcasters and their 
counsel. Moreover, so long as the fairness doctrine is not uprooted by the Supreme Court, 
cases applying its substance will be directly relevant to these succeSs6i regulations. 
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the expUci~ purpose of c.l<;l.rifying the ~d,itional £q.irn~ss (l9~trinf:3~ 
gives rise to at least an inferenc~ 9f d,etiniteness. 'l'hiI;dl ~lthough the:: 
Seventh Circuit attempted to d,emonstrate possibk theoretical ambi-
gu.ities in the regul~tiQns, it did not suggest'how they Gould be m<!.de 
more definite, In fuct, attewpting to break down the word "character," 
for example, into various c.ategories-q.g., treatment of family, gener-
osity, sex:ual attitudes-would p.ot appre<;i:;l.1;>ly increase the word's defi-
nhene&s. More serioll~ly, it would create loopholes which would vitiate 
th~ whole purpose of ~e regulations. The complex ~d continu~Uy 
c;hap..ging nature of ex;pre~sjon seems to make any sucij. attempt inher-
ently impo~sible. Finally, the CQurt's assertion that a licensee "will 
~ngage in [m01,"e] rigorous self-censorship. , . than if he w~re sub.jec.~ 
only to the Fairp.ess pOGtrjne"33 seeJIls completely wrong. Any marginal 
inqease in self.censorship will be a illnction n,Qt of th~ substance of the 
regulatiom but 1,"ather of the sanctions for noncompliance. In other 
words, although the Seventh Circuit explicitly eschewed the question 
of the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, it effectively held the 
concept of fairness-plus-sanction unconstitutional. No one was espe-
cially disturbed about a fairness doctrine which carried an overkill 
punishment, but when the same rules were ma,ted with realistic pun-
ishments, the rules themselves suddenly hecaJIle a first amendment 
threat. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the opinion is the manner in 
which it offers up its reasoning for a sacrificial reversal by the Supreme 
Court. Juxtaposed with the holding of unconstitutionality based on 
vagueness, the burden on the licensee, and the potential for censorship, 
is the afterthought that the rules could be sustained on a showing of 
both public necessity and inability to draw "less restrictive and oppres-
sive" regulations.84 Although the Seventh Circuit did not believe 'that 
the Commission had demonstrated the existence of either factor.. this 
appears to be :;l. reversible conclusion of h\.w. 'l'he coun's confusion 
becomes apparent when it demands that the Commission demonstrate 
I'a significant public interest in the attainment of fairness in broad-
casting,"35 but finds that there is no evic;lence of the "existence of wjck-
spread noncompliance."~{1 The court, in c.ond,emning the regula.tions, 
confused the existence of a legitimate public interest with its determina-
, , 
32 32 Fed, Re~. 10!305 (1968~. 
33 400 F.2d at 1016 (footnote omHted). 
34 Id. a~ 1020. 
alj l,I. 
ao Id. a~ lQ21. 
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tion that the regulations were unnecessary; public interest and necessity 
can exist quite independently of each other. 
In fact, the regulations advance first amendment goals as freshly 
defined by New York Times and later cases emphasizing the public's 
need to hear debate on public issues.37 The regulations, without forcing 
the broadcaster to initiate discussion, require him at least to give reply 
time to an opposing point of view-even if that view is "obnoxious or 
extreme." And it was a forceful reply, rather than a suit for damages, 
which the Supreme Court in New York Times endorsed as the best way 
to assuage the sting of a damaging statement.3S Further, under New 
York Times a defendant can be liable only in the presence of actual 
malice; under the regulations, a licensee will be sanctioned only in the 
absence of good faith. In neither case is a good faith action penalized. 
Thus the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the regulations represent 
an unreasonable burden under New York Times appears to be erro-
neous. 
III 
DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRE REGULATION 
OF ACCESS TO BROADCAST MEDIA? 
The first argument in favor of constitutionally mandated regula-
tions is that the government has an affirmative duty to correct a broad-
caster's discrimination between competing points of views because such 
discrimination is imputable to the government. There are three closely-
related bases for making such an imputation: that the sovereign owns 
the airwaves;39 that broadcasting is a governmental activity analogous 
to the Post Office;40 and that the granting of a license constitutes gov-
37 By their very terms the regulations operate only in the context of public issues. 
47 C.F.R. § 73.123(a) (1968) is restricted to "controversial issues," and § 73.123(c) applies 
only to elections-which are certainly public issues. 
3S 376 U.S. at 304-05. Although the broadcasters claimed that the regulations were 
as inhibiting as the absolute ban on newspaper editorials which the Supreme Court struck 
down in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), Brief for Petitioner RTNDA at 31, RTNDA 
v. United States, they provide precisely that which the Court found to be the "fatal flaw" 
of the Mills statute-a right of reply. 384 U.S. at 220. 
39 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Sta., 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). See also Communica-
tions Act of 1934, §§ 301, 309(h), 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 309(h) (1964). The recently-passed 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C.A. § 399 (Supp. 1968), forbids editorializing on 
publicly-subsidized, noncommercial, educational stations. 
40 In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946), and Public Clearing House v. 
Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) (dictum), the Court said that the Post Office could not deny 
mailing privileges to disapproved literature. It is interesting to note that in Esquire 
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ernment action inhering in private acts of the licensee.41 All three 
theories support the same conclusion-that radio and television stations 
operate only by the grace of Congress. 
A more realistic, albeit more revolutionary, approach is that the 
first amendment requires a right of access for, or, correlatively, a duty 
to present, all points of view on public issues.42 The rationale behind 
the first amendment is that the people should be exposed to the full 
spectrum of opinion on the important issues of the day.43 In the past, 
freedom from government oppression may have been enough to guar-
antee this exposure,44 but something more is needed today. The mass 
media have a mass orientation.45 Consequendy, they indulge in a form 
of mercenary self-censorship, that is probably as thorough a prior re-
straint as a bishop'S imprimatur.46 In this situation, greater protection 
for the mass media would more firmly entrench an unacceptable status 
quO.47 What is needed, instead of any absolute right of free speech, is 
an affirmative right of access to the media. 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not approached the issue.48 But 
New York Times and later cases show the Court's increasing concern 
Justice Frankfurter concurred in order to point out the possible affirmative constitutional 
mandate in the Court's decision. 327 u.s. at 159. 
41 Justice Douglas has provided a few lone comments to the effect that licensing an 
activity cloaks it with state action. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 385 (1967) (con-
curring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.s. 267, 281-83 (1963) (concurring); Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 U.s. 157, 182·84 (1961) (concurring). 
42 For two groundbreaking and thorough studies of this proposition, see 2 Z. CHAFEE, 
GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 471-719 (1947); Barron, Access To The Press-
A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). 
43 XENOPHON: Would there be any objection to a single point of view if it really 
was the truth? 
MILTON: Do you mean, would we object to God's owning all the newspapers and 
radio stations? 
PLATO: According to the doctrine of free will, even this would be bad. 
2 CHAFEE, supra note 42, at 596. Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to 
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condi· 
tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger. 
ld. at 4. 
44 2 CHAFEE, supra note 42, at 473. 
45 Barron, supra note 42, at 1646. 
46 See pp. 296·97 supra. 
47 Barron, supra note 42, at 1651·52. 
48 Except, of course, insofar as it has held that government action insuring ,access 
is not itself violative of the first amendment. See note 15 su"Pr,f!' The District of Columbia 
Circuit seemed to split over this issue in Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908, 
930 (1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967) (No. 600, 1967 Term; renumbered No.2, 
1968 Term, 37 U.S.L.W. 3001 (1968». 
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with the public's right to hear debate on conttbversial issues.49 With 
the public issue concept as a startiI1g poiI1t, it is a politically giaht) but 
doctrinally short, step to the condusion that the publit'!i right to hear 
is meaningless unless implemented by a right of access. 50 
IV 
BEYOND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 
Although the FCC was the first governmental agency to take action 
toward implementing a right of access,51 it has gone only part way-
initial action by the broadcaster is still necessary to activate the fairness 
docttine. First amendment rights, however, should not be left to the 
discretion of businessmen. The present regulations' standard of an 
initial personal attack or editorial should be replaced by a constitu-
tional standard of public issue. Instead of being obligated only to prO-
vide reply time, broadcasters should be required to seek out and present 
differing positions on public issues. Such a requitement is, admittedly, 
nebulous. What is a public issue? What efforts to seek out differing 
opinions are required? Who shall present these opinions? How much 
time must be provided for given issues and opinions? When must the 
time be provided? 
As in the ttaditional fairness docttine, however, some uncertainty 
is necessary because of the many different factual situations that will 
arise. And also, as in the fairness doctrine, both administrative con-
venience and factual complexity require that great weight be placed 
upon the good faith efforts of licensees. Because licensees may make 
good faith mistakes, an access requirement should not be codified and 
enforced against individual failures to present debate.52 Rather, any 
consistent failure by the licensee to present debate should be determined 
49 In Tittle, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967), the Court seemed to emphasize the 
need 6f the public to hear debate oli certain issues. That the Court today is oriented more 
towards the public's right to hear than the incUvidual's right to say something is indicated 
by its seeming adoption of the Meiklejohn public issue concept. See Brennan, supra note 
19. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster 
Gen., 381 U.s. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concuttiilg). 
50 Access to media may be in the nature of a "penumbral right:' since Without it 
the goal of the first amendment cannot be completely fulfilled. See GriSly-old v. COi1ilecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
61 The Commission has long recognized the right of the public to be informed: "It 
is this right of the public to be informed .•• which is the foundation stOne of the 
Anieritatl system of broadcastirtg." Editoralizing Report, supra note 1, at 3056. 
52 The Cotnmission might, of course, codify iu1 access requirement but enforce the 
statutory sanctions only on the basis of an extended course Of Conduct. 
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on. r~pew~ ~er an e~<w.lmatiQn ot hi~ whole. c;pqrse o£ 1:;Q:p,dllct duripg 
the licelliie period,53 
The Supreme Court has made vague motions towards a first amend-
mt::m: right Q£ access, and cOJllIP.entators hav~ openly qdvocated it, The 
Comm.~s~ion, hQw~ver, couJd im,plement an acce~s right 'without find-
ing a consti~tion~ ma,ngatt::. The COIPlIlUnjl;atjons Act require~ the 
Co~ission to t~~ the p1Jblil; int~l,"est: into account when renewing 
lic~nses,54 and the Coxp.p:lission has long held that a Jicep.see's service 
to his 1;0lIl.P1unity is an integral factor in' such ~ determination,55 Thus, 
an examination of whether the broadqtster has presentt::d the full scope 
of opinion on cqrrent p1Jbli~ issu~s WOllld 1ll~rely eptail a more vigor-
OUll applic:;ation of pl,"esept policies, l\.rgua1;>ly, such a requirement leaves 
too m,uch to the whim of W,e FCC,56 but \:he C~ission's action is 
l,"~viewable.. The pow~r o£ the mass media carries a CQrrel;ltive respon-
~ib~litY, UnfortPnately, mercenary self-cep,sorship has led to an 
a1;>dic;a,tion gf that l,"esPQp.~ibility, Wh,en the private se~tor turps censor, 
it is thne tQ tru~t th~ Pllbljc. 
Michael Botein 
53 The Gommi~sion appears divided as to whether a licensee's conduct after his 
renewal application has been designated for hearing is relevant to the renewal determina-
tion. Lamar Life Broadc;tSting Co., 13 P, & F RADIO REG. 2d 769 (196B). 
54 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 309 (1964). 
55 Network Pro~ming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960). 
56 The Seventh Circuit reflected a fear that . the Commission might, through sub-
jectiv\,! ipterpretation of the regulations, censor those views with which it did not agree. 
400 F.2d at 1010. Though such conduct is, of course. Within the realm of possibility, it 
would. be an jnc}ir~!=~ I!1e~ 9f censqrship-ap.d no gr~ater than that accorded to indi-
vidual jud~ Wh,o adminj~~er the Ne'll! Yprk Tirne~ wle. aq$ can be r\,!yi.ewec:l if they 
abuse their power. 
Furthermore, the COIIJAliss~on p;tS alwftn s~iec,l !J.way frQIIl looking tQ the lll~rits of 
program content. In Station KTYM, 9 P & F RAnlq REG. 2d 2'11 (1967), the C;:ommission 
refused to deny a li~~nse reI!ewal Qn ~e gropnd of :jlleg~d "hate" programs. Its emphasis 
on gopd f:\ith illsq ~eff~11$ an ilttemJ>t not tQ lool< at lll;ogrflII! cant~nt. 
